Double Patterns: A Usable Solution to Increase the Security of Android
  Unlock Patterns by Forman, Timothy J. & Aviv, Adam J.
Double Patterns: A Usable Solution to Increase the Security of
Android Unlock Patterns∗
Timothy J. Forman
U.S. Naval Academy
tforman37@gmail.com
Adam J. Aviv
The George Washington University
aaviv@gwu.edu
Abstract
Android unlock patterns remain quite common. Our study,
as well as others, nds that roughly 25% of respondents use
a pattern when unlocking their phone. Despite known se-
curity issues, the design of the pattern interface remains un-
changed since rst launch. We propose Double Patterns, a
natural and easily adoptable advancement on Android un-
lock patterns that maintains the core design features, but
instead of selecting a single pattern, a user selects two,
concurrent Android unlock patterns entered one-after-the-
other super-imposed on the same 3x3 grid. We evaluated
Double Patterns for both security and usability by conduct-
ing an online study with 푛 = 634 participants in three treat-
ments: a control treatment, a rst pattern entry blocklist,
and a blocklist for both patterns. We nd that in all set-
tings, user chosen Double Patterns are more secure than
traditional patterns based on standard guessability metrics,
more similar to that of 4-/6-digit PINs, and even more dif-
cult to guess for a simulated attacker. Users express posi-
tive sentiments in qualitative feedback, particularly those
who currently (or previously) used Android unlock pat-
terns, and overall, participants found the Double Pattern in-
terface quite usable, with high recall retention and compa-
rable entry times to traditional patterns. In particular, cur-
rent Android pattern users, the target population for Dou-
ble Patterns, reported SUS scores in the 80th percentile and
high perceptions of security and usability in responses to
open- and closed-questions. Based on these ndings, we
would recommend adding Double Patterns as an advance-
ment to Android patterns, much like allowing for added PIN
length.
1 Introduction
There are two primary, knowledge based authentication
methods for unlocking mobile devices: 4/6-digit PINs and
Android unlock patterns. Prior work has shown (and is
conrmed herein) that patterns are used by about 25% of
users [7, 16, 19]. Despite there being 389,112 possible pat-
∗A version of this paper is appears at the 2020 Annual Computer Se-
curity Applications Conference (ACSAC’20).
terns (more than 38x more than 4-digit PINs), it is known
that users likely select from a much smaller subset of pat-
terns in easily predictable ways [7, 26], much more so than
how users select 4-/6-digit PINs [19, 29].
Unlike the shift from 4-digit to 6-digit PINs (or longer),
there has not been a signicant change to the interface of
Android patterns since rst launched on the Android T-
Mobile G1 (or HTC Dream) in 2008 as the rst commer-
cially available Android device1, where a pattern was the
only available unlock authentication option. There have
been various proposals to improve patterns, including pro-
viding user guided selection [12], rearrangement of the con-
tact points [25], strength meters [3, 23, 24], and expansion
to a 4x4 grid [7]. These proposals require either a depar-
ture from the distinctly simple selection interface or addi-
tional interventions that may frustrate users, driving them
away from selecting their preferred patterns. More natural
expansions of patterns, such as 4x4 patterns, have unfor-
tunately been shown to not increase security [7] against a
throttled attacker making a limited number of guesses.
To address these challenges, we oer a novel improve-
ment to Android patterns: Double Patterns (or DPatts),
whereby a user selects two sequential, superimposed pat-
terns as their unlock authentication (see Figure 1). Utiliz-
ing an identical 3x3 grid, the user draws their rst pattern,
lifts, and then draws their second pattern, with both pat-
terns being displayed at the same time. This provides an
increase in the visual complexities for users to select pat-
terns and a large increase in the total number of DPatts
(151,407,759,432 options) as compared to traditional unlock
patterns. The design of DPatt takes advantage of the popu-
lar 3x3 interface and encourages users to select more secure
patterns through the natural increased complexity of mul-
tiple patterns.
We conducted an online survey on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to assess the potential usability and security of DPatt,
rst in a preliminary survey with 푛 = 286 participants and
then in a main study with 푛 = 634. In the course of the sur-
vey, participants both selected a DPatt and answered ques-
tions about their experiences and perceptions of DPatt as
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTC_Dream (viewed on Au-
gust 26, 2020)
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Figure 1: Double Pattern Creation Process
an alternative for Android patterns. We considered three
treatments for DPatt: a control treatment and two blocklist
enforced treatments. Using the preliminary survey data, we
developed two blocklists, one in which the rst pattern of
a DPatt was blocklisted and must be re-selected before se-
lecting the second pattern, and the second blocklist blocked
a set of common DPatts.
We evaluated the security of the DPatts using guess-
ability metrics and compared the results to the security of
4/6-digit PINs and traditional Patterns (without a blocklist).
When the attacker is throttled, or limited in the number of
guesses, we nd that DPatt’s security metrics are more in-
line with (but still weaker than) 4-/6-digit PINs. After 30
guesses, a perfect knowledge attacker [9] would only guess
28% of DPatts compared to 35% of patterns, and only 20%
of 4-/6-digit PINs are guessed after 30 attempts. However,
when considering a simulated attacker that guesses an un-
known set of DPatts based on modeling from a sample set,
DPatts outperform both traditional patterns and 4-/6-digit
PINs. After 30 guesses an attacker would only guess 5.3% of
DPatts compared to 23.6% of patterns, 7.6% of 4-digit PINS,
and 9.0% of 6-digit PINs. The addition of either blocklist
(rst pattern or Double Pattern) also greatly improved the
security metrics for both a perfect knowledge (18% and 20%
after 30 attempts, respectively) and simulated attacker (1.9%
and 0.9% after 30 attempts, respectively).
Participants recalled their selected DPatts at very high
rates (97% success after 1.3 attempts), with extremely com-
parable entry speeds per attempt of 3.35s (on average across
treatments). Prior work suggests that traditional Android
pattern entry takes 3.0s and 4-digit PINs take 4.7s [16].
Among the 25% of participants currently using patterns as
their method to unlock their device, they reported System
Usable Scale (SUS) scores of 78.27, placing it in the 80-84th
percentile range. Even participants who currently do not
utilize a pattern report good and acceptable SUS scores of71.47, falling in the 60-64th percentile range. This suggests
that if deployed to the target audience of current pattern
users, they would be open to moving towards Double Pat-
terns from the traditional pattern.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a natural extension to Android unlock pat-
terns, Double Patterns (DPatts), where users must en-
ter two superimposed patterns, in sequence, as their
authentication.
• We show that DPatts signicantly improve the secu-
rity of patterns using guessability metrics, for both a
perfect-knowledge and simulated attacker, and may be
more secure than 4-/6-digit PINs against simulated at-
tackers.
• The usability of DPatts is not degraded by requir-
ing multiple pattern entries, with per-attempt entry
speeds comparable to traditional pattern entry and
high short-term recall rates.
• Participants reported usability as good and acceptable
and had a high perception of security regarding DPatt,
which would encourage adoption.
• Participants currently utilizing patterns, the target
population for DPatt, reported even higher positive
sentiment for DPatt, both in usability metrics and per-
ceived security of DPatt authentication.
Our results suggest that Double Patterns are an ex-
tremely viable improvement to the traditional Android un-
lock pattern, both from a security and usability perspective,
and that current Android pattern users would be willing to
adopt DPatt as a natural extension to Android patterns.
2 Double Patterns
Double patterns are built upon Android unlock pat-
terns, which are a knowledge-based authentication system,
whereby a user must recall a pre-selected “pattern” by con-
necting points on a 3x3 grid, without lifting. For example,
the left side of Figure 1 shows a traditional pattern, which
could have been entered by selecting the top-left point and
tracing downward, or selecting the bottom-middle point
and tracing upwards (two dierent patterns). A pattern
must be drawn such that at least four contact points are
used, no point is used more than once, and any unselected
point cannot be avoided or traced over without being pre-
viously selected. In total there are 389,112 possible pat-
terns [5].
Double Patterns (or DPatts) are also designed to be a
knowledge based authentication system whereby a partic-
ipant must recall two previously selected Android patterns
entered in sequence. Both patterns in a DPatt are super-
imposed, allowing for more complex visual shapes, and the
patterns must also be entered in the exact order to be au-
thenticated. For example, Figure 1 the two inverted ‘L’ pat-
terns combine to form a ‘T’ pattern as the DPatt.
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The same restrictions on the individual Android patterns
exist—at least four points, a point cannot be used more than
once, and unselected points cannot be avoided—but after
entry of the rst pattern, all contact points can be used in
the second pattern, as if it was drawn independently. The
only restriction on the second pattern is that it must be a
dierent pattern than the rst. There are 151,407,759,432
total DPatts.
3 Related Works
There is much prior work on Android patterns. Andri-
otis et al. [2] provided one of the rst studies regarding
user habits when selecting unlock patterns. Uellenbeck et.
al [26] collected a sample of Android patterns and analyzed
the guessability of so called “defensive” patterns chosen to
purposely avoid guessing and “oensive” patterns chosen
to guess others’ patterns. Uellenbeck et. al found that An-
droid patterns, theoretically, were only as diverse as select-
ing a random 3-digit PIN. Aviv et al. [7] conducted an online
study asking participants to self-report patterns, conrm-
ing that user selection of Android patterns are less diverse
than other authentication choices. Loge et al. [18] investi-
gated selection of patterns in dierent settings, such as to
secure a banking app or shopping cart in addition to phone
unlocking, nding, again, that the security of Android pat-
terns is challenged. A summary and comparison of these
results and others related to Android pattern is provided by
Aviv and Dürmuth [4].
Android patterns have also been the subject of attack.
Aviv et al. rst demonstrated a smudge-based side channel
attack [5], whereby residues left on the smartphone screen
reveal prior pattern entries, and have since been shown
to boost guessing performance of an attacker [11]. Pat-
terns have also been shown to be less resilient to shoul-
der surng [8, 20], as well as video-based reconstruction
attacks [30]. Even the onboard sensors of smartphones can
reveal information about pattern input [6].
Due to the insecurity and lack of diverse choices for An-
droid patterns, there have been many proposals for im-
provement. This included modications to avoid shoulder
surng [14, 27] and smudge attacks [17, 22], which main-
tain the primary design of Patterns but transform the input
procedure. Other more radical proposals include rearrang-
ing the points of the pattern, such as into a ring [25].
Password meters are another common proposal for im-
proving pattern selection. Andriotis et al. [3], Sun et al. [24],
and Song et al. [23] each proposed visual based strength
metrics and a display meter to boost diversity of patterns
selected. While meters may be an eective means of chang-
ing behavior, Golla et al. demonstrated that strength met-
rics used in these meters do not correlate with security, and
likely, just the presence of the meter changes behavior [15].
Cho et al. proposed SysPal [12], which highlights cer-
tain contact points that must be used as part of the pattern,
restricting users to select dierent patterns but also more
diverse ones. von Zezschwitz et al. suggested that back-
ground images can improve pattern selection, if suciently
complex [28]. Aviv et al. investigated 4x4 patterns [7], nd-
ing that there are little benets from larger patterns.
Double patterns oers a new direction in improving An-
droid patterns as it is a natural and straightforward pro-
gression in design. DPatts maintain the same popular in-
terface and improve security without direct interventions,
such as highlighting points, providing background images,
or including password meters. Additionally, the use of mul-
tiple patterns increases the burden on observation attacks
whereby shoulder surng and video-based attacks would
be more challenging due to the added complexity.
In evaluating the performance of DPatts we also consider
research into other mobile unlock authentications, such as
4-/6-digit PINs. Bonneau et al. studied user choice of 4-digit
PINs in the credit-card, chip-and-pin system [10], nding
that many users select PINs derived from dates. Wang et al.
studied 4-/6-digit PINs derived from leaked password data
sets [29], nding subtle dierences between English speak-
ing and Chinese speaking users’ selection of PINs, and that
the advantages of 6-digit PINs is minimal. Markert et al.
collected 4-/6-digit PINs in the context of smartphone un-
lock, further demonstrating that there are minimal benets
of 6-digit PINs and the current use of blocklists [19].
We compare DPatts to the security of 4-/6-digit PINs
based on data provided by Markert et al. as it is speci-
cally primed for smartphone authentication. We use data
from von Zezchwitz et al. [28], Aviv et al. [7], Uellenbeck et
al. [26], and Loge et al. [18] to compare DPatt to traditional
patterns, as well as to derive a synthetic DPatt data set used
in our guessing analysis.
4 Methodology
To evaluate Double Patterns (DPatts), we developed an on-
line, browser-based survey and recruited via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk). Using their own personal mobile
devices, participants completed the survey by creating/re-
calling a DPatt, as well as answering questions about their
experience. For the main study, we recruited 푛 = 634 par-
ticipants in three treatments: a control treatment and two
blocklist treatments. The complete survey material can be
found in Appendix A.
4.1 Survey Outline
There are 12 sections to the survey. Participants are rst
informed about DPatts and allowed to practice creating
DPatts, before being tasked to select one that they might
use to unlock their smartphone. Following, participants an-
swer questions about their experience selecting a DPatt and
the perceived usability and security, before being asked to
recall their selected DPatt. It took participants, on average,
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Table 1: Participant Device Utilization
Control BL-First BL-Both Overall
Iris Recognition 0 2 1 3 (.5%)
Finger Print 108 106 111 325 (51.3%)
Facial Recognition 26 26 26 78 (12.3%)
No Biometric 72 70 67 209 (33.0%)
Other Form 3 7 6 16 (2.5%)
Pattern 57 49 56 162 (25.6%)
4-Digit PIN 96 89 98 283 (44.6%)
6-Digit PIN 29 34 36 99 (15.6%)
PIN of Other Length 8 8 7 23 (3.6%)
Alpha-Numeric 6 12 9 27 (4.3%)
Not Listed 11 16 7 34 (5.4%)
Prefer not say 2 3 1 6 (0.9%)
Total 209 211 214 634
7.3 minutes to complete the survey; the survey, in its en-
tirety, can be found in Appendix A. The protocol for the
study was approved by the IRB of our institution(s).
1. Purpose of Study/Informed Consent: Participants were
informed about (and consented to) the study be-
fore proceeding, this included details that participants
would be asked to select/recall a Double Pattern and
answer questions about their experiences.
2. Device Usage: Participants were asked to provide back-
ground on the number of mobile devices (e.g., smart-
phones) they currently use, as well as which mobile
authentication method they currently use to unlock
their devices. For those that indicated that they use
a biometric, we provided a follow up question asking
how the participant unlocks their device following a
phone reset, or when their biometric fails. Details of
the device usage can be found in Table 1, and just over
25% of our participants use a Android pattern to secure
their smartphone.
3. Android Patterns/Double Patterns Background: As not
all participants were familiar with Android patterns,
we provide information about them as well as how
they related to Double Patterns, such as:“Double Pat-
tern Locks are the same as Pattern Locks but require
you to ‘draw’ two shapes on the same 3x3 grid of con-
tact points. The combination of the two patterns en-
tered in the same order is now used to unlock your
smartphone.”
4. Practice: Participants were presented with the DPatt
interface and asked to practice using it by creating (and
conrming) a DPatt before proceeding. This provided
familiarity and ensured that participants’ rst interac-
tion would not be used as part of the analysis.
5. Instructions: Now familiar, participants were informed
that the next DPatt selected would be used as part of
the study. They were asked to “create a Double Pattern
you would likely use for a personal device unlock, such
as you would use on your smartphone.” They were also
instructed that “you will need to recall this Double Pat-
tern later in the survey, so choose something that is
secure and memorable.” Two conrmations were re-
quested at this point: (a) that the participant under-
stood that they are supposed to create a Double Pattern
for a personal device unlock, and (b) that they should
not write down their Double Pattern or use other aids
to help them remember it.
6. Selection: Participants were then instructed to select a
DPatt, and the instructions to select something for un-
locking their smartphone were also included on this
page (see Figure 1). During selection, a participant
may experience an enforcing blocklist, which disal-
lows a predetermined set of DPatts. We describe the
treatments below in Section 4.2.
7. Post-Entry: After selection participants are asked Lik-
ert agreement for two statements: if the DPatt pro-
vides adequate security for unlocking their device, and
their diculty in selecting the DPatt. As well, par-
ticipants were asked an open-text response regarding
their strategy in selecting the DPatt they chose.
8. SUS: The 10 question System Usability Scale was then
administered to determine the perceived usability of
DPatt.
9. Recall: After the distractor tasks above, participants
were asked to recall their selected DPatt. After ve at-
tempts, if they were unable to recall their DPatt, par-
ticipants were allowed to indicate that they could not
remember and proceed with the survey.
10. Security Comparison: Participants were then asked
about the perceived security of DPatt itself, and to
compare it to Android patterns, 4-digit PINs, 6-digit
PINs, and alpha-numeric passwords using a Likert
agreement scale.
11. Use Double Pattern from Survey: Then, participates
could indicate and explain if they would use the DPatt
selected in the survey as their own unlock authenti-
cation, if Double Patterns were used, or if they would
choose a dierent DPatt (or were unsure.)
12. Demographics: Finally, participants were asked to pro-
vide demographic information, such age, identied
gender, dominant hand, education, and technical back-
ground.
4.2 Treatments
Each participant was randomly assigned a treatment:
• Control: In the control treatment participants re-
ceived no intervention when selecting/recalling a
Double Pattern.
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Figure 2: Blocklist Warning
Table 2: Results of Asking Participants if they were com-
fortable using the DPatt they selected.
Pattern Users Non-pattern Users Overall
Yes No Unsure Yes No Unsure Yes No Unsure
Control 17 20 20 69 40 43 86 60 63
BL-First 24 13 12 60 51 51 84 64 63
BL-Both 26 19 11 72 48 38 98 67 49
Total 67 52 43 201 139 132 268 191 175
• BL-First: In the blocklist rst (or BL-First) treatment,
a blocklist of rst component patterns (the rst of
the two patterns in a DPatt) was used to restrict the
choices of Double Patterns. After entering the rst
pattern, and before proceeding to select the second
pattern, the participant would be prompted to change
their pattern if the rst pattern is blocklisted, and
would need to continue to select rst patterns until
one is chosen that is not blocklisted, after which they
proceed to selecting their second pattern.
• BL-Both: In the blocklist both (or BL-Both) treatment,
a blocklist is used to match both patterns of a DPatt
against a blocklist of disallowed Double Patterns. If the
participants selection is blocklisted, they are required
to select a dierent DPatt until they select one that is
not blocklisted.
To determine the blocklists, we relied on data collected dur-
ing prototyping of the survey with 푛 = 286 participants.
During the prototype, we asked participants to select two
dierent Double Patterns (572 total), one for two dierent
scenarios as described in Loge et al. [18], either a shopping
cart, banking account, or mobile unlock. Participants al-
ways select a mobile unlock, and then either shopping cart
or banking account.
For the BL-First treatment, we used the top 20 most com-
mon rst pattern occurrences, and for the BL-Both pattern,
we constructed a blocklist from the 20 most common Dou-
ble Patterns. There is not prior work on blocklist sizes
for patterns, and so we focused on a short blocklist rather
than an expansive one. The blocklists used can be found
in Appendix B. A visual for the blocklist message can be
found in Figure 2, which matches the blocklist message
from iOS [19], modied for patterns.
The main study diered from the prototype in three main
ways. First, as we did not observe major dierences be-
tween the scenarios, we elected to have participants focus
on just the smartphone unlock scenario, the scenario we
Table 3: Demographic Information of the Participants
Control BL-First BL-Both Total
18-24 17 26 19 62
25-29 52 61 55 168
30-34 45 41 57 143
35-39 47 35 35 117
40-44 14 21 17 52
45-49 17 11 14 42
50-54 6 7 9 22
55-59 5 5 3 13
60-64 2 1 2 5
65+ 2 3 3 8
Prefer not to say 2 0 0 2
Male 112 123 135 370
Female 95 84 74 253
Non-binary 0 3 5 8
Prefer not to say 2 1 0 3
Tech 62 66 55 183
No-Tech 140 139 154 433
Prefer not to say 7 6 5 18
High School 18 15 25 58
Trade 15 6 5 26
Some-College 42 43 47 132
Associates 24 27 16 67
Bachelor’s 82 92 89 263
Master’s 19 16 26 61
Professional 0 5 4 9
Doctorate 4 3 1 8
Prefer not to say 4 0 0 4
Total 209 211 214 634
envision Double Patterns being deployed. Second, we iden-
tied numerous conations in bias in our questions that
were improved in an expanded survey. Third, we imple-
mented two blocklisting treatments alongside our control
treatment.
4.3 Recruitment
As part of the main study, we recruited 645 participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and after removing par-
ticipants who failed attention checks and/or provided in-
consistent responses, we included 푛 = 634 participants in
the our analysis: 209 in the control treatment, 211 in BL-
First treatment, and 214 in BL-Both treatment. As is typi-
cally the case for MTurk, the sample is mostly young (67.5%
between 25-39), mostly male identifying (58% male, 40% fe-
male, and 2% other gender, or prefer not to say), and better
educated (75% with some college or more educational back-
ground) than the US as a whole. Participant demographic
is presented in Table 3, and additional demographic infor-
mation can be found in Appendix C.
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Start Point
2.37%
51.89% 9.46% 10.09%
4.57% 2.37% 1.42%
16.40% 1.42% 2.37%
20.0
20.03% 13.88% 22.87%
7.26% 4.89% 4.89%
12.78% 5.68% 7.73%
First  Pattern Second Pattern
End Point
1.90%
2.05% 8.68% 12.78%
8.68% 8.20% 11.83%
7.89% 13.25% 26.66%
6
6.78% 5.99% 10.73%
6.94% 8.68% 10.09%
15.14% 11.36% 24.29%
First  Pattern Second Pattern
Figure 3: Frequence of Start/End Choices Across Treat-
ments.
4.4 Limitations
There are a number of limitations with our methods. First,
as the survey is online, without direct observations, it is
possible for participants to not follow directions properly
and provide inconsistent responses. We attempted to miti-
gate this limitation by including attention tests and review-
ing responses. Additionally, collecting data via MTurk in-
troduces some bias in the demographics (as noted above),
more balanced collection would be needed to support
claims regarding selection for demographics, which we do
not make here. As the survey is relatively short, the recall
rates of DPatts reect short-term memorability of DPatts.
We believe that high short-term recall would correlate with
good long-term recall, but to support stronger claims about
memorability, a longitudinal study would be needed.
This survey may be many participants rst experience
with Android patterns (in any form), and as such the DPatts
selected may not fully reect choices in the wild. To miti-
gate this, we asked participants if they would use their cho-
sen DPatt on their own device. Overall, 42.3% said that they
would use the DPatt selected during the survey on their de-
vice, if Double Pattern was available, 30.1% expressed they
would not, and 27.6% indicated they were unsure if they
would use the DPatt selected during the survey (see Ta-
ble 2). The primary reason to not use the DPatt selected dur-
ing the survey (or were unsure) was the fact that the DPatt
was recorded as part of the survey, while a smaller num-
ber described wanting something more secure or complex
(see Table 10 in Appendix). This suggests that the meth-
ods of the survey provide ecological validity for the scope
of DPatts users may select in the wild.
5 Results
In this section we describe the results of our analysis of se-
curity and usability of Double Patterns. First, we describe
the statistics of DPatt choice, including the frequency of
various DPatts and features therein. We then oer a se-
curity analysis using guessability as a metric and compare
DPatt with other mobile authentication options, such as
4-/6-digit PINs and Android patterns. Finally, we provide
analysis of the usability based on the SUS responses, en-
try/recall rates, and qualitative responses.
Datasets As described previously, the survey applies
three randomized treatments: a control treatmenet with no
intervention; a blocklist rst (BL-First) treatment, where
the rst pattern of a DPatt is blocklisted; and a blocklist
both (BL-Both) treatment, where the combination of the
two patterns in a DPatt is blocklisted.
We also compare the security of DPatt to 4-/6-digit PINs
from Markert et al. [19], which were collected with similar
methodologies, a collection of 3x3 Android patterns used in
a survey [4] and originally collected in Aviv et. al [7], Uel-
lenbeck et al. [26], Loge et al. [18], and von Zezchwitz et
al. [28]. Additionally, we make use of a 4-digit PIN dataset
collected by Daniel Amitay [1], and a dataset of 6-digit
PINs derived from the RockYou password breach [13]. Both
datasets are used in similar ways by Wang et al. [29] and
Bonneau et al. [10].
5.1 Double Patterns Features
Table 4 reports the most frequent patterns in each treat-
ment. The rst pattern of a DPatt is indicated in blue,
and the second pattern is indicated in green. The start-
ing contact point of each individual pattern is dieren-
tiated in bold. Common DPatts tend to be symmetric
in shape; such as a box or ipped S’s. A second com-
mon theme is non-overlapping/singularly-overlapping seg-
ments where the individual patterns only share a single
point or no points in common, for example, rotated ⊓ or⊔ shapes.
Observing the most common individual patterns, com-
pared to the 3x3 patterns reported in Aviv et al. [4]: 90.69%
of the rst patterns and 86.75% of the second patterns were
previously observed in the dataset. Similarities of individ-
ual patterns is further supported when looking at the com-
mon start and end contact points, as presented in Figure 3.
As was the case in prior work, participants are likely to
start in the upper left and end in the lower right. However,
this eect is less evident for the second component pattern,
where the preference is more spread across the top row.
This suggests that selecting the second pattern, with the
presence of the visual rst pattern, does alter some of the
choices by individuals, as evident in the lower percentage
of second patterns previously observed in the prior work.
6
Table 4: Frequence of Double Patterns
Control BL-First BL-Both Total
freq = 5
freq = 4
freq = 3
freq = 2
Remaining Double Patterns with
Single Occurrence Omitted
freq = 3
freq = 2
Remaining Double Patterns with
Single Occurrence Omitted
freq = 7 freq = 5
freq = 4
The blue pattern indicates the rst pattern, and the green indicates the second pattern in the Double Pattern. Each contains a bold circle that denotes the starting point.
When comparing the length (the number of points used
in a pattern), we nd that there is a signicant dierence be-
tween the length of the rst component pattern and second
pattern (푈 = 181136.5, 푝 < 0.001), where the rst pattern is
slightly longer than the second. This suggest that partici-
pants are “tting in” their second pattern into the shape of
the rst, and likely using fewer contact points to do that.
There were no observed statistical dierences between the
length of individual patterns or the combination of patterns
in a DPatt between the treatments.
After DPatt selection, participants were asked to describe
their strategy regarding their chosen pattern, as well as Lik-
ert agreement towards two questions: if the Double Pattern
provides adequate security, and if it was dicult to choose
an appropriate Double Pattern for unlocking a personal de-
vice. Examining a 25% sub-sample of users, we coded their
responses to the open question, and each participant was
assigned between one and three codes, depending on the
depth of their response. Regarding strategy, the most fre-
quently cited strategies include aspects of visual charac-
teristics (59.3%), memorability (50.7%), personal familiar-
ity (11.3%), usability (10%), and security (4%). Of the 25%
sub-sample, only a small portion attributed their decision
to random choice (5.3%). This is supported by the obvious
structure observed in the patterns in Figure 4.
5.2 Security
In this section, we discuss the evaluation of security of
DPatts. We rst outline the threat model, and then provide
guessability analysis for two attacker variants, a perfect-
knowledge and simulated attacker
Threat model. We make the following assumptions
about the attacker in our threat model. First, the attacker
is generic and not targeting a specic victim. A targeted
attacker may have additional information about the vic-
tims tendencies or have previous observations (e.g., shoul-
der surng [8, 14, 21, 27]), and thus, a generic attacker
provides a lower bound for attacker performance. It also
provides direct comparisons to other mobile authentica-
tion [4, 7, 10, 19, 29].
We consider two variations of the generic attacker: a per-
fect knowledge and a simulated attacker. A perfect knowl-
edge attacker is an upper bound on the performance of a
generic attacker, and assumes that the attacker knows the
exact distribution of frequencies of authentication being
guessed (the perfect knowledge), and thus always guesses
the next most frequent pattern. A simulated attacker, how-
ever, has a set of training data of the authentication, and
must use that information to guess a set of unknown au-
thentication.
Perfect knowledge attacker. The primary results of the
perfect knowledge attacker analysis is presented in Table 5.
We present the guessing statistics for DPatt, as well as
comparisons to other mobile authentication for 3x3 Pat-
terns [7, 18, 26, 28] and 4-/6-digit PINs [19]. As the data
sets are of varied sizes, for a more fair comparisons we ran-
domly down-sampled the larger data sets to 209 and report
the average (and inset median) of 500 repetitions. We con-
sider two metrics for a perfect knowledge attacker, as de-
scribed by Bonneau et al. [9].
First, for a throttled attacker who has a limited number
of guesses, the 훽-success-rate, which describes the percent-
age of the dataset guessed after 훽 guesses. Reported as 휆훽
in Table 5, one can observe that traditional 3x3 patterns
(and also 4x4) have much worse (higher guessing percent-
ages) than 4-/6-digit PINs; however, the DPatt improves the
situation greatly. After 10 guesses, (control) DPatt perform
more similarly to PINs, but after 30 guesses, the percent-
age of control DPatt guessed greatly increases. Using ei-
ther blocklisting technique greatly degrades the attacker
performance, where BL-First treatment produces an even
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Table 5: Perfect Knowledge Attacker Guessing Metrics (Avg.[Med.] of 500 randomized runs)푛 휆3 휆10 휆30 퐻∞ 퐺̃0.05 퐺̃0.10 퐺̃0.20
Control 209 6.22% [6.22%] 15.31% [15.31%] 28.23% [28.23%] 3.73 [3.73] 3.93 [3.93] 4.22 [4.22] 5.12 [5.12]† BL-First 211 2.87% [2.87%] 8.61% [8.61%] 18.18% [18.18%] 4.65 [4.65] 4.76 [4.76] 5.27 [5.27] 6.45 [6.45]† BL-Both 214 3.83% [3.83%] 10.53% [10.53%] 20.33% [20.57%] 4.24 [4.24] 4.56 [4.56] 4.88 [4.88] 6.24 [6.21]† 3x3 Patterns [7, 18, 26, 28] 4637 7.36% [7.18%] 17.67% [17.70%] 35.17% [35.41%] 3.52 [3.55] 3.69 [3.67] 3.99 [4.03] 4.85 [4.89]† 4-digit PINs [19] 851 4.20% [4.31%] 10.02% [10.05%] 19.79% [19.62%] 3.96 [3.96] 4.45 [4.40] 4.98 [4.92] 6.29 [6.32]† 6-digit PINs [19] 369 6.65% [6.70%] 10.93% [11.00%] 20.50% [20.57%] 3.15 [3.15] 3.56 [3.59] 4.69 [4.68] 6.22 [6.22]† Random downsampling to the size of Control (209 Double Patterns).
Table 6: Simulated Attacker Throttled Guessing Perfor-
mance
Blocklist Hits 3 Guesses 10 Guesses 30 Guesses
n No. % No. % No. % No. %
Control 209 – 4 1.9% 9 4.3% 11 5.3%
BL-First 211 70 33.2% 0 0% 2 1.0% 4 1.9%
BL-Both 214 19 8.9% 0 0% 1 0.5% 2 0.9%
3x3 Patterns 4637 – 245 5.3% 556 13.0% 1089 23.6%
4-Digit PINs 851 – 27 3.2% 39 4.6% 65 7.6%
6-Digit PINs 369 – 19 8.1% 24 6.5% 33 9.0%
stronger authentication then 4-/6-Digit PINs.
The 퐻∞ statistic, which relates to a throttled attacker
performance, describes how diverse (in bits of entropy) the
most frequent authentication is in the data set. For exam-
ple, this measures how common is the most common au-
thentication, like “password” or “1234,” and how much ben-
et an attacker gains from just guessing the most common
password. While there is a small improvement for control
DPatt as compared to other authentications, the blocklist
treatments greatly decrease the commonality of the most
common authentication. This suggests that minimal inter-
action in the selection process can lead to increased security
in user choice.
The second metric, 훼-guess-work, correlates with an un-
throttled attacker that is unconstrained by the number of
attempts to guess an authentication. Here we measure, in
bits of entropy, how much “work” is required to guess an훼 fraction of the data set. Higher entropy describes more
work for the attacker, and thus stronger authentication.
These results are indicated by 퐺̃훼 in Table 5. In all cases,
we nd that DPatt is more diverse (has a higher entropy)
and thus more secure than traditional patterns. For guess-
ing 20% of the data, the control treatment DPatt is nearly
0.5 bits higher, and the BL-First treatment is nearly 1.5 bits
higher. The security of DPatt, again, is more similar to that
of 4-/6-digit PINs, and in some cases stronger.
Simulated attacker. Recall that a simulated attacker
must guess a set of unknown authentications based on a set
of training data. One such way to model this situation in-
cludes cross-fold validation, where the data is divided into푛 folds and the attacker trains on each of 푛 − 1 folds, guess-
ing the remaining fold (the test set). As the DPatt data sets
are not large enough for sucient cross-fold validation, we
take a dierent approach to generate a synthetic training
set from traditional 3x3 patterns.
Comprising of 4,637 patterns, the simulated training set
was constructed based on other published data of 3x3 pat-
terns [7, 18, 26, 28]. We transformed these into Double Pat-
terns by matching each pattern with every other pattern,
allowing for repetition of DPatts. We removed any invalid
DPatts where the two patterns are the same. As an exam-
ple: if there were 10 occurrences of ‘L’ shaped patterns in
the data set and 5 occurrences of ‘M’ shaped patterns, the
synthetic training set would have 50 ‘L-M’ DPatts and 50
‘M-L’ DPatts, but no ‘M-M’ nor ‘L-L’ as these are invalid
DPatts.
This method provided us with 21,421,974 DPatts, which
we sorted based on frequency order. The simulated attacker
then guessed DPatts from most frequent to least frequent
in the synthetic data set. More advanced techniques for or-
dering DPatts in the synthetic data set could be used, such
as ordering completely by a Markov model, but we found
through experimentation that simply guessing in frequency
order was the attacker’s best strategy where ties are bro-
ken by the Markov model. In the blocklist treatments, we
assumed the attacker had knowledge of the blocklist, and
thus avoided guessing disallowed DPatts.
In a world where DPatts are actively used, an attacker
would instead train on known DPatts as used in the wild
(or at least self-reported to be used). We could simulate
such a scenario by performing a cross-validation simulated
guesser, whereby we divide the data into 푛 groups, train
on 푛 − 1 of them and guess the remaining. Unfortunately,
the size of data is not sucient to support this method. For
example, with a standard cross-validation of 5 groups (or
folds), the attacker would train ∼150 and only guess ∼50
DPatts, which is too small to potentially generalize. We
instead opt for a simulated DPatt set. Future research on
this topic, where additional DPatts were collected, could
use this data as training to evaluate the security of newly
collected DPatts.
We used similar guessing techniques when comparing
DPatt to 4-/6-digit PINs. We followed the same strategy
outlined by Market et al. [19] where they used the Amitay
4-digit data set [1] and the RockYou 6-digit data set [13]
to guess their sample of PINs. When comparing DPatt to
3x3 patterns, we used a cross-fold validation as there are
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no available secondary data sets to use of sucient size, and
followed the guessing methods outlined by Aviv et al. [7].
The main guessing results are presented in Figures 4
and 5 and Table 6. Observe that DPatts, across all treat-
ments, are more challenging for a simulated attacker to
guess than other deployed authentication choices. At 30
guesses the attacker can only guess 5.3% of the control
treatment DPatts, compared to 23.6% of traditional 3x3 pat-
terns, 7.6% of the 4-digit PINs, and 9.0% of the 6-digit PINs.
The disparity in strength between DPatt and other meth-
ods only increases with the implementation of blocklisting,
where 1.9% of the BL-First patterns and 0.9% of the BL-Both
patterns are discovered at 30 guesses. This suggests that
signicant security improvements could be gained from us-
ing DPatt even without a blocklist, but a blocklist would
further enhance the security.
We also analyzed the individual patterns of a DPatt. In
Figures 6 and 7, we perform simulated guessing of the rst
and second pattern (respectively) by guessing based on fre-
quency order of the 3x3 data set. As before, we assume
the attacker has knowledge of the blocklist. In the control
treatment, the second component pattern is more dicult
to guess than the rst component (48.3% vs. 22.9% after
30 guesses), which suggest that participants choose more
diverse second patterns to assist in visualizing a complete
DPatt. Interestingly, the second component pattern of the
control treatment is roughly as dicult to guess as tradi-
tional 3x3 patterns (23.6% after 30 guesses). These results
suggest that, without interventions, while participants se-
lect individual patterns of a DPatt that are no stronger (and
often weaker) than selecting a single pattern, it is the com-
bination of the two patterns in a DPatt that provides the
added security.
5.3 Usability
In this section, we discuss the usability of DPatts based on
the SUS scores, entry times, recall rates, response to secu-
rity perception questions, and qualitative feedback. To code
qualitative responses, we randomly selected a 25% sub-
sample of the responses (50 responses from each treatment).
Two coders independently coded the responses and met to
collaboratively code responses where coding diered.
Entry/Selection time Across all treatments, it took par-
ticipants a mean time of 27.14s (sd=16.93s) to select a DPatt,
taking an average of 3.70 attempts (sd=2.99) per participant,
or 4.93s (sd=2.16s) per attempt. Recalling their DPatt is sim-
ilar to an entry event, as in, participants do not need to com-
plete the complex task of selection. When recalling their
DPatt, participants spent an average of 4.94s (sd=3.01s) us-
ing 1.37 attempts (sd=0.84). Across all treatments the mean
time per attempt was 3.34s (sd=1.34s), and the mean time
per correct attempt was 3.35s (sd=1.31s). For comparison,
related work has shown that Android patterns take on av-
erage 3.0s to enter and PIN’s take 4.7s [16], so DPatt adds
only minimal time overhead to pattern entry. For a more
detailed breakdown of selection and entry times, refer to
Table 7.
Perceptions of usability We use the System Usability
Scale to measure participants perception of usability. Re-
ported in Table 8, across all treatments, an SUS score of
73.21 was reported, which is acceptable usability in the
60th percentile. However, when you break down the results
based on current (or prior) Android pattern users, there is
a much higher perception of usability. These participants
provided an average SUS score of 78.27 which is in the
80th percentile for SUS. While there were dips in SUS due
to blocklisting, across all treatments Android pattern users
rated DPatt more favorably.
Perceptions of security We asked participants to sub-
jectively evaluate the security of DPatts in relation to exist-
ing method of authentication, using Likert agreement scale
responses. We asked about the security of DPatt itself, and
in comparison to original Android patterns, 4-digit PINs, 6-
digit PINs, and alpha-numeric passwords. We also observed
dierence in responses of pattern users and non-patterns
users (푈 = 31740.5, 푝 < 0.001).
Overall, participants responded positively to DPatt as
a secure way to unlock their devices, 80% either agreed
or strongly agreed. When compared to the original pat-
tern interface, 74% either agreed or strongly agreed that
DPatts were more secure. 82% prior and current pattern
users observed that the interface was more secure (agreed
or strongly agreed), while 70% of non-pattern users felt the
same way. Similar trends were found in other results: only
55% of non-pattern users felt DPatts were more secure than
4-digit PINs, but 76% current pattern users did and 52%
felt it was even more secure than 6-digit PINs and alpha-
numeric passwords (53%). This suggests that current pat-
tern users would feel condent in using DPatt due to secu-
rity, and even non-pattern users have high security percep-
tions, up to 6-digit PINs.
We also collected Likert agreement responses regarding
the perceived security of the DPatt selected by the partici-
pant: 83% of our sub-sample agree (or strongly agree) that
the DPatt they chose provided adequate security for un-
locking their personal device. With respect to selection dif-
culty, the results in this category were more evenly split:
32% strongly agreed or agreed that it was dicult to choose
an appropriate DPatt, 14% neither agreed nor disagreed, and
54% strongly disagreed or disagreed that it was dicult to
choose. This suggest that most participants believe they
are choosing secure DPatts and that it not dicult to do so.
Willingness to adopt Our survey asked participants if
they would, would not, or were unsure if they would utilize
10
Table 7: Average (stdev.) Setup/Recall Time for Double Patterns (outliers removed using Tukey fencing)
Setup Recall
Treatment Time Attempts Time/Attempt Time Attempts Time/Attempt Entry Time Recall Rate
Control 25.41s (14.57s) 3.16 (2.49) 5.26s (2.41s) 4.74s (2.80s) 1.36 (0.86) 3.29s (1.31s) 3.29s (1.30s) 97.13%
BL-First 35.50s (25.28s) 4.45 (3.58) 4.85s (2.11s) 5.26s (3.27s) 1.45 (0.94) 3.51s (1.45s) 3.54s (1.40s) 94.79%
BL-Both 23.44s (12.74s) 3.47 (2.62) 4.70s (1.95s) 4.75s (2.82s) 1.30 (0.70) 3.21s (1.23s) 3.19s (1.19s) 97.20%
Total 27.14s (16.93s) 3.70 (2.99) 4.93s (2.16s) 4.94s (3.01s) 1.37 (0.84) 3.34s (1.34s) 3.35s (1.31s) 96.37%
Table 8: Simple Usability Scale sentiment.퐧 Num.Pat. Users SUSPat. Users SUSNon-Pat. Users Combined
Control 209 57 78.55 70.90 72.99
BL-First 211 49 77.81 69.68 71.56
BL-Both 214 56 78.39 73.84 75.04
Total 634 162 78.27 71.47 73.21
the Double Pattern they selected within the survey. Fol-
lowing this they were asked to expand on their choice in a
free response form. Dierentiated by previous pattern use
and treatment, the results can be found in Table 2. Across
all treatments, 42.3% reported they would be comfortable
using the DPatt they selected, 30.1% reported they would
not, and 27.6% were unsure. Of the coded 25% sub-sample,
we found that the most frequently cited reason (>50%) for
non-utilization within the sub-sample was the notion that
the participant’s DPatt had been collected in the survey, so
they would want to choose a new DPatt. We believe that
this suggests DPatts found in the wild would likely be sim-
ilar to those collected here, or at least more complex than
those found in our survey results.
Reected in Table 10 in the Appendix, we found that
the top three reasons participants would choose to utilize
a DPatt as their authentication method is the memorabil-
ity of the pattern they chose, the notion that they like the
new interface itself, and the belief that DPatts themselves
are secure, respectively. Regarding memorability, it makes
sense that this is the top reason participants chose to uti-
lize their DPatt, as we also asked participants to describe
their strategies when choosing their DPatt during selection,
and over half of the 25% sub-sample reported making their
DPatt memorable as an aspect of their strategy.
Coinciding with memorability is the visual aspect of
DPatts. Table 4 portrays visual representations of the most
frequently chosen DPatts within our survey. In addition,
we examined participants’ quantitative responses regard-
ing DPatt selection. Reported in Table 9, roughly 60% of
the sub-sample cites using visual aspects of DPatts in their
selection strategy. Also detailed in Table 9 are participants’
post pattern selection notions regarding their own creation
strategy, as well as a self evaluation of their DPatt’s security
and how dicult it was for them to choose their DPatt.
Non-Pattern Users
Pattern Users
Non-Pattern Users
Pattern Users
Non-Pattern Users
Pattern Users
Non-Pattern Users
Pattern Users
Non-Pattern Users
Pattern Users
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Double Patterns are more secure than the original Android Patterns for unlocking my personal device.
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Double Patterns are more secure than 6-digit PIN codes for unlocking my personal device.
Double Patterns are more secure than alpha-numeric passwords for unlocking my personal device.
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Nor Disag… Agree Strongly Agree
Response
Figure 8: Likert Results for Pattern Users Comparison.
6 Discussion
Android pattern users continue to be a large cross-section
of mobile device users, ~25% in this study, and there has not
been a signicant implementation change in Android pat-
terns since initially deployed in 2008. While still preferred
less than PINs, it is fair to assume that this stable user base
will continue to prefer the graphical password interface
that is unique to Android devices. However, without vi-
able alternatives and extensions that provide increased se-
curity without degrading the user experience, current An-
droid pattern users are less protected then their counter-
parts. Our results indicate that Double Patterns (DPatts)
oer real potential as a natural extension to traditional An-
droid patterns, that would be readily adopted and naturally
increase security.
DPatt has strong usability. Participants in our study en-
tered DPatts at roughly the same entry speed, less than a
second slower (3.35s vs. 3.0s estimate in previous work).
There was also high memorability > 94% for a short-term
study. In qualitative feedback, only two participants from
our 25% sub-sample (of about 150 participants) noted they
were concerned with DPatt being cumbersome. Moreover,
participants oered more than acceptable SUS scores, and
more encouraging, participants that already use an Android
pattern rated its usability in the 80-84th percentile. In fact,
in the casual feedback to the study, a few participants noted
that they were excited to see DPatts come to their device
soon, expecting this to be a new feature of Android pat-
terns.
DPatts also greatly increase the security of Android
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patterns without potentially frustrating user interaction.
While blocklisting further improved DPatt, even the control
case provides increased security more comparable to 4-/6-
digit PINs. Other proposals require re-selection of Android
patterns, e.g., SysPal [12] or meters [3, 23, 24], potentially
frustrating users away from their preferred choices, which
they may reselect anyway if systems were non-enforcing.
DPatt instead would be viewed as a new extension, more
similar from going for 4- to 6-digit PINs, naturally encour-
aging users to extend their prior selected pattern in a new
way that would increase security without the need of ad-
ditional interventions. This is evident by the fact that the
individual patterns of a DPatt that participants selected in
this survey are no more secure (or perhaps less secure) than
traditional Android patterns; it is the combination of two
patterns that provides the security.
Finally, while most participants in our survey believed
DPatts are a secure way to unlock their personal device,
current Android pattern users perceive DPatt as particu-
larly secure, especially in comparison to other methods.
This is a crucial view that suggests DPatts would be read-
ily adopted if available, particularly to pattern users. Users
would not be willing to change their authentication method
to a system that they believe will harm them, and it is
clear that DPatts provide a strong incentive for this group
to upgrade their security while maintaining their preferred
graphical password method.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed using Double Patterns (DPatts)
as an extension to Android patterns, whereby users enter
two patterns, in sequence and super-imposed, as their un-
lock authentication. We conducted an online survey with푛 = 634 participants selecting DPatts in three treatments:
a control treatment, rst pattern blocklist, and a full, DPatt
blocklist.
We nd, that across treatments, DPatts greatly increase
the security compared to traditional Android patterns. A
simulated attacker that must guess an unknown DPatt
based on some training data, would only guess 5.3% of the
DPatts in the training set after 30 attempts as compared to
23.6% of Android patterns. Blocklisting could be a viable
option for further improving security, only 1.9% and 0.9%
of DPatts in the rst-pattern blocklist and full DPatt block-
list (respectively).
DPatts also provide minimal (if any) degradation in us-
ability. Even in a short survey, participants recalled their
DPatts at high rates (> 94%), and entry time is comparable
with other current authentication methods, 3.35s. Observ-
ing current Android pattern users, this group had very high
usability ratings as well as positive perceptions of the se-
curity of DPatts. As this is the group most likely to adopt
DPatts (if deployed), this suggests that DPatts would be well
received as a natural extension to Android patterns.
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Appendices
A Main Survey
Purpose of Study and Task Description: We are conducting an
academic survey about the use of Double Patterns in mobile
authentication, and you will be asked to complete a sur-
vey that will ask you to generate a number of patterns un-
der dierent conditions. You are being asked to participate
in a research study focused on the eectiveness of using
multiple patterns for mobile authentication on an Android
device. Androids implement pattern locks rather than tra-
ditional security parameters, for example, numeric PINs or
Alphanumeric Passcodes. Our research will focus on imple-
menting an additional pattern lock as an increased security
measure, and we are investigating the eectiveness of such
a method. You will be asked to complete a short survey that
requires you to generate a set of Android patterns under a
security scenario, such as locking your device. Your even-
tual choices will be used in the nal evaluation, as well as
your responses to a set of security and usability questions.
The expected completion time of the survey is 8-10 min-
utes, and no more than 1 hour. You will be compensated
$1.00 for your participation.
Device Usage Questions
When referring to "mobile devices" throughout this survey,
consider these to include smartphones and tablet comput-
ers. Traditional laptop computers, two-in-one computers,
like the Microsoft Surface, or e-readers, like the Amazon
Kindle, are not considered mobile devices for the purposes
of this survey.
1. How many mobile devices do you use regularly?◦ 0 ◦ 1 ◦ 2 ◦ 3 ◦ 4+
2. What brands of smartphone do you use for personal
use? (Select all that apply)◦ Apple ◦ Samsung ◦ LG ◦ Motorola ◦ Google/Pix-
el/Nexus ◦ Huawei ◦ ZTE ◦ Other
3. What biometric method do you use most often to un-
lock your primary personal smartphone?◦ Fingerprint ◦ Face ◦ Iris ◦ Other Biometric ◦ I
do not use a biometric ◦ I do not use a smartphone◦ Prefer Not to Say
4. If choose biometric: You have indicated that you use
a biometric on your smartphone. Please answer the
following question related to your response. How do
you unlock your primary personal smartphone when
you reboot the device or if your biometric fails?◦ Pattern Unlock ◦ 4-Digit PIN ◦ 6-Digit PIN ◦
PIN of other length ◦ Alphanumeric Password ◦
I use an unlock method not listed ◦ I do not use a
smartphone ◦ Prefer Not to Say
If did not choose biometric: You have indicated
that you do not use a biometric on your smartphone.
Please answer the following question related to your
response. What unlock method do you use on your
primary personal smartphone?◦ Pattern Unlock ◦ 4-Digit PIN ◦ 6-Digit PIN ◦
PIN of other length ◦ Alphanumeric Password ◦
I use an unlock method not listed ◦ I do not use a
smartphone ◦ Prefer Not to Say
What are Android Pattern Locks? Pattern Locks are used to
unlock your smartphone, like a PIN. Patterns require you
to "draw" shape that connects at least four of the contact
points without lifting your nger or repeating a contact
point. Displayed below is the Pattern Lock interface on a
Samsung Android mobile device.
What are Double Pattern Locks? Double Pattern Locks
are the same as Pattern Locks but require you to "draw"
two shapes on the same 3x3 grid of contact points. The
combination of the two patterns entered in the same order
is now used to unlock your smartphone.
Each pattern in a Double Pattern is drawn the same way
as before, but once you nish drawing your rst pattern by
lifting your nger, you then draw a second pattern. When
drawing your second pattern, the rst pattern will be dis-
played, and you may reuse contact points from your rst
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pattern in drawing your second. However, you may not
use your rst pattern as your second pattern.
In this survey, we are exploring the possibility of using
Double Pattern Locks as a new way to secure mobile
devices. On the next page, you will have a chance to
practice entering a Double Pattern before proceeding with
the rest of this survey, where we will ask you to select your
own Double Pattern that you would use to unlock your
personal smartphone.
Practice: Practice entering a Double Pattern. (see Fig-
ure 1 for visual.)
Instructions: For this survey, you will be asked to cre-
ate a Double Pattern you would likely use for a personal
device unlock, such as you would use on your smartphone.
You will need to recall this Double Pattern later in the
survey, so choose something that is secure and memorable
as you may use on your personal device.
We ask that you DO NOT write down your patterns or use
other aids to help you remember.
I understand that I should not write down my patterns or
use other aids to assist in the survey. ◦ I understand
I understand that I will be asked to create a Double Pattern
for a personal device unlock. ◦ I understand
Selection
Create a Double Pattern for a Personal Device Unlock. (See
Figure 1 for visual.)
Post Entry Questions: Thinking about the Double Pat-
tern Lock you just chose:
5. I feel that the Double Pattern I created provides ade-
quate security for unlocking my personal device.◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither Agree Nor Dis-
agree ◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree
6. It was dicult for me to select a Double Pattern that I
would use to unlock my personal device.◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither Agree Nor Dis-
agree ◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree
7. Everyone has a strategy when choosing their authenti-
cation, what was your strategy when choosing a Dou-
ble Pattern? [open text]
Simple Usability Scale: Select your agreement/disagreement
with the following statements. Please note that the term
"system" refers to Double Pattern Unlock. (Likert Response:◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither Agree Nor Disagree◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly Disagree )
8. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
9. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
10. I thought the system was easy to use.
11. I think that I would need the support of a technical
person to be able person to be able to use this system.
12. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this sys-
tem.
13. I found the various functions in this system were well
integrated.
14. I would imagine that most people would learn to use
this system very quickly.
15. Select Agree as the answer to this question. (attention
check)
16. I found this system very cumbersome to use.
17. I felt very condent using this system.
18. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going
with this system.
Recall Double Pattern: Recall the selecting Double Pattern.
(See Figure 1 for visual.)
Security Comparison: Select your agreement/disagreement
with the following statements. (Likert Response: ◦ Strongly
Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither Agree Nor Disagree ◦ Disagree◦ Strongly Disagree ) (Randomized order.)
19. Unlock patterns are more secure than 6-digit PIN
codes for unlocking my primary smartphone.
20. Unlock patterns are more secure than 4-digit PIN
codes for unlocking my primary smartphone.
21. Unlock patterns are more secure than alphanumeric
passwords for unlocking my primary smartphone.
22. Unlock patterns are a secure way to unlock my pri-
mary smartphone.
Use Double Pattern from Survey:
23. In a situation where your biometric fails or your mo-
bile device reboots and you are utilizing a Double Pat-
tern to unlock your personal mobile device, would you
use the Double Pattern you selected in this survey, or
would you select a dierent one?◦ Yes, I would use the Double Pattern I created here on
my personal device.◦ No, I would not use the Double Pattern I created here
and instead create a new Double Pattern on my per-
sonal device.◦ Unsure, I may or may not use the Double Pattern I
created here on my personal device.
24. [You have indicated that you would use / You have
indicated that you are unsure if you / You have indi-
cated that you would not use if you would use] the
Double Pattern that you created in this survey on your
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personal mobile device. Please expand on why you
[would / are unsure if you you / would not] use the
Double Pattern you created here. [Open Text]
Please Enter Your Demographic Information:
25. Select your age: ◦ 18-24 ◦ 25-29 ◦ 30-34 ◦ 35-39 ◦
40-44 ◦ 45-49 ◦ 50-54 ◦ 54-59 ◦ 60-64 ◦ 65+ ◦
Prefer Not to Say
26. Select your gender ◦ Female ◦ Male ◦ Non-
Binary/Third Gender ◦ Not Described Here ◦ Prefer
Not to Say
27. What is your dominate hand? ◦ Left Handed ◦ Right
Handed ◦ Ambidextrous ◦ Prefer Not to Say
28. Where you live is best described as ◦ Urban ◦ Subur-
ban ◦ Rural ◦ Prefer Not to Say
29. What is the shape of a red ball? ◦ Red ◦ Blue ◦ Square◦ Round ◦ Prefer Not to Say
30. What is the highest degree or level of school you have
completed? ◦ Some high school ◦ High school ◦ Some
college ◦ Trade, technical, or vocational training ◦
Associate’s Degree ◦ Bachelor’s Degree ◦ Master’s
Degree ◦ Professional degree ◦ Doctorate ◦ Prefer
Not to Say
31. Which of the following best describes your educa-
tional background or job eld? ◦ I have an education
in, or work in, the eld of computer science, computer
engineering or IT. ◦ I do not have an education in, nor
do I work in, the eld of computer science, computer
engineering or IT. ◦ Prefer Not to Say
B Blocklists
Patterns referenced by upper left contact point as 0, moving
left to right counting, where the lower right contact point
is 8.
• BL-First: (0.3.6.7.8), (0.3.6.7), (0.1.2.5.8), (0.3.6.4),
(0.1.4.7), (0.1.2.5), (0.3.6.7.8.5.2), (0.4.8.5), (0.3.4.5),
(0.4.8.7.6), (6.3.0.1.2), (0.1.2.4.6), (0.1.2.4.6.7.8),
(2.5.8.7.6), (6.3.0.1), (0.4.8.5.2), (6.4.2.5.8), (0.3.4.1),
(6.3.0.4) ,(1.4.7.8)
• BL-Both: (0.3.6.7.8 2.5.8.7.6), (0.3.6.7 1.2.5.8),
(0.3.6.7 2.5.8.7), (0.4.8.5 2.4.6.3), (0.4.8.7.6 2.4.6.7.8),
(0.3.6.7.8 8.5.2.1.0), (0.1.2.5.8 0.3.6.7.8), (0.1.4.7 2.1.4.7),
(0.3.6.7.8.5.2 2.5.8.7.6.3.0), (0.1.2.5.8 8.5.2.1.0), (0.3.6.7.8
0.1.2.5.8), (2.5.8.7.6 0.3.6.7.8), (6.3.0.1 8.5.2.1), (0.1.2.5
3.6.7.8), (0.3.4.1 1.4.5.2), (0.3.6.7.8.5.2 6.3.0.1.2.5.8),
(0.1.2.4.6 6.7.8.4.0), (0.3.4.7.8 2.5.4.7.6), (5.4.7.6 3.4.7.8),
(0.3.4.5 1.4.7.8),
C Additional Tables and Figures
Control BL-First BL-Both Total
Tech 62 66 55 183
No-Tech 140 139 154 433
Prefer not to say 7 6 5 18
Left-Handed 24 16 31 71
Right-Handed 177 188 176 541
Ambidextrous 7 7 7 21
Prefer not to say 1 0 0 1
Rural 34 32 36 102
Suburban 98 108 116 322
Urban 75 71 62 208
Prefer not to say 2 0 0 2
Total 209 211 214 634
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Table 9: Code Book "Strategy" using 25% Sub-Sample (50 per-Treatmet)
Everyone has a strategy when choosing their authentication, what was your strategy when choosing a Double Pattern?
Code Frequency Sample Quote
Memorability-memorable 76 "Choosing something that was memorable but not predictable to anyone that may try to unlock my phone."
Visual-shape 22 "I go for a shape I like and that is easy to remember."
Visual-letter 19 "My rst name starts with the letter C so I drew a big C and a little C."
Choice-personal 17 "First letter of my father’s rst name and my mother’s rst name."
Visual-simple 17 "I wanted something simple enough to remember."
Usability-feel 10 "Something that felt natural to me."
Choice-random 8 "To make it as random as possible."
Visual-number 8 "I viewed the dots as a 1-9 keypad and entered memorable numbers."
Visual-unique 7 "One that would be hard to replicate in the correct order but easy for me to remember."
Visual-related 6 "I chose patterns with similar motions that would be easy to remember."
Visual-symmetry 5 "I use symmetrical patterns."
Security-secure 4 "I tried to make it not too complicated because I knew I’d have to remember it without writing it down or
anything. But I tried to make it not too simple so that it felt secure enough."
Visual-reverse 3 "Using one shape and mirroring it."
Usability-physical 2 "Easy to do one handed."
Usability-usable 2 "I wanted something that I could remember & would be easy to do with either hand."
Choice-condent 1 "I just liked the pattern I chose."
Feeling-dislike 1 "I didn’t have a strategy because I’ve never used this method and don’t intend to."
Guessability-hard 1 "I picked something that couldn’t easily be guessed and at the same time not to dicult to memorize."
Thinking 1 "Thinking."
Security-visual 1 "I wanted something both memorable to me but dicult to watch."
Usability-timely 1 "Tried to use something that I could remember and was quick."
Visual-repeat 1 "Repeat the pattern to remember it better."
Visual-subset 1 "Nothing really but I stayed within a smaller area."∗ Note that each quote can be assigned multiple codes.
I feel that the Double Pattern I created provides adequate
security for unlocking my personal device.
Strongly
Agree Agree NAND Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
40 83 17 9 1
It was dicult for me to select a Double Pattern that
I would use to unlock my personal device.
Strongly
Agree Agree NAND Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
24 24 21 46 35
17
Table 10: Code Book "Would use DPatt" using 25% Sub-Sample (50 per-Treatment)
You have indicated that you (would use | would not use | are unsure if you would use) the Double Pattern you created in this survey on your
personal mobile device. Please expand on why you (would use | would not use | are unsure if you would use) the Double Pattern you created here.
Choice Code Frequency Sample Quote
Would Use 56
Memorability-memorable 27 "It’s easy to remember and is similar to my current single pattern but more secure."
Feeling-like 21 "I liked the idea and I would like to test it for several weeks."
Security-secure 16 "I thought it added a good measure of safety that I would like."
Choice-condent 8 "I think I came up with good pattern."
Guessability-hard 8 "It would be hard to guess but easy for me to remember."
Choice-previous-use 3 "I already use the one half of the pattern and have for as long as I’ve had an Android."
Choice-dierent 2 "I think that it would be the only patterns that I could remember for sure. If I created dierent
ones I would denitely forget about them."
Security-visual 2 "Using Secret number code I will create the pattern.so no one can know my pattern."
Usability-feel 2 "It’s easy enough to remember and I like the design."
Usability-timely 2 "It seems secure and it easy to remember. It also seems like it will be fast to enter each time."
Usability-usable 2 "It was easy to remember. It was easy to use."
Visual-complex 2 "It is complex yet I can remember it."
Visual-shape 2 "I draw ags regularly. It is also dicult for a stranger to guess."
Visual-unique 2 "It seems unique and complicated enough to detour people unlike PINs."
Choice-personal 1 "It’s a pattern I’m already familiar with."
Recall 1 "Because of your recall."
Visual-letter 1 "The Z pattern has always been my pattern."
Visual-simple 1 "It’s easy for me to remember. And even though it’s a simple shape it would take a few tries
for someone who saw it to get right since the same shape can be achieved in many ways."
Would Not Use 49
Choice-no-reuse 26 "I would not use this one because it has been recorded on this survey."
Choice-complexity 9 "I used it here and would probably make it slightly more complex."
Choice-dierent 7 "I can think of something else easier but more secure for me to remember."
Security-unsecure 6 "I wouldn’t use the same pattern twice for the same reason I don’t reuse passwords; it’s unse-
cure."
Memorability-unmemorable 5 "It was way too dicult to remember."
Visual-simple 4 "It was a little too simple. I only needed to remember the pattern for the survey so I didn’t
choose anything too complex."
Choice-personal 2 "I’d want something more original and personal to me."
Feeling-dislike 2 "I would use a PIN."
Guessability-easy 2 "I think everyone I know would automatically guess that I would use this symbol as my pass-
word just knowing my sense of humor."
Usability-cumbersome 2 "I have issues with memory. I wouldnt want to be stuck in an emergency."
Usability-rushed 2 "I would want to think about what pattern I would use for a longer time than is available
during this survey."
Feeling-like 1 "I would not want to use a double pattern that I had used or someone knew about. I love the
idea of using a double pattern."
Memorability-memorable 1 "I made it easy so I could remember it. But that’s not good for security reasons."
Visual-number 1 "I think the one I created is pretty standard and generic. I would use the same idea of creating
a visual number with the pattern."
Unsure 45
Choice-complexity 10 "I might choose a more complicated one."
Choice-no-reuse 9 "I would likely want to mix it up and use a dierent one that hasn’t been previously shown to
anyone including on the study. But also I liked the patterns I came up with."
Choice-dierent 5 "I would have more time to select a secure double pattern."
Choice-condent 5 "I would probably try the one that I created here."
Feeling-dislike 5 "PIN is easier to remember."
Security-unsecure 5 "I may make my pattern dierent than the one shown before. I may think of a new pattern
that would make my phone more secure and safer."
Memorability-unmemorable 4 "I had some trouble remembering it exactly at times so I may do something more simple but I
think I’d get it with time."
Memorability-memorable 4 "It felt a little too easy however easy to remember. I may want something a little more complex."
Usability-cumbersome 3 "I don’t feel like a longer line or more dots will help. Also drawing longer lines can sometimes
give you errors."
Guessability-easy 3 "I don’t think my pattern was dicult enough. I would want to make something harder for
someone to guess."
Choice-random 2 I might have a dierent rst response when setting up a new double pattern so it could vary
or I could use the same thing if it pops up in my head rst.
Usability-feel 2 "I have my pin memorized by muscle memory so its probably easier than a double pattern."
Usability-rushed 1 "I would like to have more time to select a secure double pattern."
No-password 1 "I dont usually have a password on my phone. But considering it in the future maybe."
Visual-complex 1 "It depends. I may use an even simpler pattern. I have already shared my pattern here so I
may change it to something else."
Feeling-like 1 "If I had another device I would. I use one I have used for a long time right now."
Don’t-know 1 "I don’t know."∗ Note that each quote can be assigned multiple codes.
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